EN BANC
EN BANC
DECISION
In nineteen seventy-five, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, a religious seminary which has a working arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila University regarding accreditation of common students, to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for credit during summer, to continue her studies. Squarely meeting the issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground that students in the position of petitioner possess, not a right, but a privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition did not prosper.
In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the concept encompassing the right of a school to choose its students.
Eighteen years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to its students, this time in Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again challenged.
Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the individual concerned was not a regular student, the respondents in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the earlier case, the petitioner was refused admittance, not on such considerations as personality traits and character orientation, or even inability to meet the institution's academic or intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the classroom. The school pointedly informed her that it would seem to be in your best interest to work with a Faculty that is more compatible with your orientations.
On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into petitioner University have been found guilty of violating Rule Number three of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The case attracted much publicity due to the death of one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries inflicted on another.
Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the concept of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, this time a case fraught with social and emotional overtones.
The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as follows:
As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on February eighth, ninth and tenth, nineteen ninety-one, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital on February tenth, nineteen ninety-one. He was not the lone victim, though, for another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.
In a notice dated February eleventh, nineteen ninety-one, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within seventy-two hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. Through their respective counsels, they requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits.
In a notice dated February fourteenth, nineteen ninety-one, the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule three of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge on or before February eighteenth, nineteen ninety-one; otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses.
On February twentieth, nineteen ninety-one, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against respondent students.
In a letter dated February twentieth, nineteen ninety-one, respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule Number three of the Rules on Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: The complaint/charge against you arose from participation in acts of hazing committed during the Aquila Legis initiations held on February eighth to tenth, nineteen ninety-one. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of students, showing your participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations. Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their written answers to the above charge on or before February twenty-second, nineteen ninety-one, otherwise they would be deemed to have waive their defense.
In a motion dated February twenty-first, nineteen ninety-one, respondent students, through counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held in abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the evidence against them.
Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on February twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-one to clarify their answers with regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation of Rule Number three. However, in a letter to petitioners dated February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-one, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from February twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-one to March first, nineteen ninety-one.
Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March second, nineteen ninety-one for clarificatory questions. They were also informed that:
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid down in the case of Guzman versus National University,
b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes;
c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the proposed bill of Senator Jose Lina, Senate Bill Number three eight one five;
d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the petitioners in the alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty; e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the University, i.e. Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J.
On March fifth, nineteen ninety-one, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean del Castillo that, in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the Administration so that this case be decided not just on the Law School level but also on the University level.
In a resolution dated March nine, nineteen ninety-one, the Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule Number three of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the physical hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the needs of the neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Eleven Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President of the University the decision of whether to expel respondent students or not.
Consequently, in a resolution dated March ten, nineteen ninety-one, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming that they did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondent students are still guilty in accordance with the principle that "where two or more persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the respondents can be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education and contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Twelve
In a resolution dated March eighteen, nineteen ninety-one and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, the Board excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of March ten, nineteen ninety-one, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also set the investigation of the two students on March twenty-one, nineteen ninety-one.
On March eighteen, nineteen ninety-one, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the second semester of schoolyear nineteen ninety-one. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.
On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent students and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident. Fifteen
Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then held. On April seven, nineteen ninety-one, the temporary restraining order issued on March eighteen, nineteen ninety-one lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereneta to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to the original petition. Sixteen
Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplemental Petition arguing that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory twenty-day lifetime. Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April ten, nineteen ninety-one. Eighteen
On May seventeen, nineteen ninety-one, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issues of the instant case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of fifty thousand pesos. Nineteen
On the same date, May seventeen, nineteen ninety-one, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza concluded its investigation. On May twenty, nineteen ninety-one, it imposed the penalty of dismissal on respondent students Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students. Twenty
The following day or on May twenty-one, nineteen ninety-one, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by respondent students of a bond dated May seventeen, nineteen ninety-one in the amount of fifty thousand pesos.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule sixty-five with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order questioning the order of respondent judge reinstating respondent students dated May seventeen, nineteen ninety-one. On May thirty, nineteen ninety-one, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May seventeen, nineteen ninety-one order of respondent judge. Twenty-one
In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on academic freedom, namely: (one) whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (two) whether or not the penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances.
We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of respondent students. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of the charges against them.
It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the contrary, respondent students' rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman versus National University, Alcuaz versus PSBA, Quezon City Branch and Non versus Dames Two have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held before they were expelled.
Corollary to their contention of denial of due process is their argument that it is the Ang Tibay case twenty-five and not the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
"One. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; Two. that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired; Three. they shall be informed of the evidence against them; Four. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and Five. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case."
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students on February eleventh, nineteen ninety-one to submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. While some of the students mentioned in the February eleventh, nineteen ninety-one notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to February eighteenth, nineteen ninety-one to file their statements.
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February fourteenth and twentieth, nineteen ninety-one. It is to be noted that the February twentieth, nineteen ninety-one letter which quoted Rule Number three of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices or letters dated February eleventh, fourteenth and twentieth clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiller and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February fourteenth, nineteen ninety-one order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March second, nineteen ninety-one hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.
Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the February fourteenth, nineteen ninety-two order clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March tenth, nineteen ninety-one was preceded by a hearing on March second, nineteen ninety-one wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.
With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the nineteen ninety-one Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be over-emphasized that the charge filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare in previous cases of a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill Number three eight one five, the proposed bill on the subject of Senator Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a student, to the extent of dismissal or
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a student, to the extent of dismissal or
expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship and esprit de corps, it has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule sixty-five considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby bypassing the latter and the Court of Appeals.
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from petitioner university.
Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer irreparable damage in the event that private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the nineteen thirty-five, nineteen seventy-three and the present nineteen eighty-seven Constitutions.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy versus New Hampshire, thus: One. who may teach; Two. what may be taught; Three. how it shall be taught; and Four. who may be admitted to study.
Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State," has deservedly earned for himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In three hundred ninety-nine B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of "corruption," the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about:
"Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord: they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they soon discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them, instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected - which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies."
Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.
In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of the new German universities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries such as the Universities of Leiden, Helmstadt, and Heidelberg. The movement back to freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human rights of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. "Academic freedom," the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression, and the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers, and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure.
But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of: one. who may teach and two. how to teach.
It is to be realized that this individual aspect of academic freedom could have developed only pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: one. what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and two. who may be admitted to study.
In the Philippines, the Acts which were passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of nineteen hundred two and the Philippine Autonomy Act of nineteen hundred sixteen made no mention of the rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.
The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section five of the nineteen hundred thirty-five Constitution which stated: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State university at that time, being the University of the Philippines, the Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense of the rest.
In an attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the nineteen hundred seventy-three Constitution provided in its Section eight: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a delegate to the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor."
Has the right been carried over to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of nineteen hundred eighty-six came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two Constitutions, as found in Article fourteen, Section five states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . " Gascon finished off the broken thought, - "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of nineteen hundred eighty-two, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.
Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school that includes Theology as part of its curriculum and assiduously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of the order of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and ruthless acts are the more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.
In essence, education must ultimately be religious - not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence." It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila University has been lost on the respondent students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them.
Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah versus Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperilled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between the offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed in Malabanan versus Ramento.
Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded on the following undisputed facts: that on February eighth, ninth and tenth, nineteen ninety-one, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section one hundred forty-six of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated May seventeenth, nineteen ninety-one reinstating respondent students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of Ateneo de Manila University dated March tenth, nineteen ninety-one, is REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May twentieth, nineteen ninety-one is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Chief Justice, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Junior, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, Justices, concur.
Griño Aquino, Justice, is on leave.
Cruz, Justice, concur in the result. I do not join in the statements in the ponencia which seem to me to be a prejudgment of the criminal cases against the private respondents for the death of Lenny Villa.