1 Bodily self-reference
1 Bodily self-reference
The concept of reference has many applications across the cognitive sciences. In philosophy and linguistics, for example, it characterizes one relation in which a sign stands to an object. In this sense, naming is a paradigm of reference, as when the name "Julius Caesar" refers to Julius Caesar. By extension, computer scientists talk of pieces of data in one data structure referring to data in other structures when they give a way of accessing items in the second data structure (e.g. by specifying an address). These canonical usages are primarily symbolic, and seem to make sense only in the context of languages, whether natural languages or programming languages. In order to discuss bodily self-reference, however, we need a more inclusive notion of reference. We certainly do have linguistic and conceptual devices for referring to our own bodies body. But these devices are grounded in fundamentally non-symbolic, nonlinguistic, and nonconceptual ways of apprehending and experiencing the body - or so I shall argue. It is easier to see this if we work with a framework that is not tied to language and that allows for both conceptual and nonconceptual ways of referring to the body.
For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, I will be understanding the notion of reference somewhat differently. - not as an abstract relation, but as an activity, something that thinking subjects do. To refer to something, in the sense I am using, is to pick it out in a way that exploits or establishes a cognitive connection to it. I cannot refer to something that I cannot in some sense discriminate. At a minimum, this requires being able to single the thing out from its environment. This type of singling out can occur in many ways. It might involve a gesture (ostension). It could take place through various types of perceptual discrimination. Or it might involve making or understanding some sort of linguistic act.
The idea that reference exploits or establishes a cognitive connection is intended to emphasize that it involves more than being able to respond to what is being referred to. For me to refer to an apple in a bowl of fruit it is not enough that I be able reliably to select the apple when prompted. I also need to be aware of it in a way that impacts and interacts with other aspects of my cognitive life - as something nice to eat, for example. The cognitive connection can take many other forms. For example, it might involve being able to keep track of the apple as it moves over time. Or the capacity to act upon it. Another, more sophisticated variety of cognitive connection would be the ability to ascribe various properties to it, either linguistically or in thought.
Terms such as "singling out" and "cognitive connection" are theoretically loaded and theoretically contested. My aim in this chapter is to elucidate them in the specific context of bodily self-reference. By "bodily self-reference" I mean the general capacity that we have, and that we share with many other types of sentient being, to discriminate our bodies as distinctive objects in the world. In virtue of this general capacity, which has multiple facets, we are cognitively connected to our bodies in ways that inform most, if not all, aspects of our cognitive and affective lives. This cognitive connection to our bodies is an integral part of our being aware of ourselves as embodied subjects.
This chapter develops an account of bodily self-reference at the nonconceptual level, that is, as a primitive capacity that is shared with various types of nonlinguistic creature, as well as with prelinguistic creatures. Bodily self-reference is a key part of what I have elsewhere called nonconceptual self-awareness. It is more primitive than the conceptual ways we have of referring to our bodies and to ourselves as embodied. Section 1 sketches out the general distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content and points to some reasons for thinking that possession of the first-person concept is an ability that depends upon participation in a public language. In section 2 I argue that there is a significant gap between possessing self-specifying information about one's body and being in a state with genuine first-person content. In section 3 I suggest that bodily self-reference is key to bridging that gap, while in section 4 I develop an account of bodily self-reference, drawing on the work of Gareth Evans, on which it involves calibrating two fundamentally different ways of thinking about the body as an object. Bodily self-reference is a matter of being able to think about the spatial location of one's body both egocentrically and allocentrically simultaneously - an ability that can be manifested conceptually, but need not be.
1.1 Conceptual and nonconceptual dimensions of bodily self-reference
1.1 Conceptual and nonconceptual dimensions of bodily self-reference
As I am taking it in this chapter, to refer to something is to pick it out in a way that establishes a cognitive connection to it, or exploits an existing cognitive connection. This cognitive connection is typically manifest in some sort of cognitive or affective state. In central cases, this cognitive or affective state will represent the world as being a certain way. The way in which the cognitive or affective state represents the world is standardly termed its content. The way I propose to approach the topic of bodily self-reference is through the content of the states that manifest the cognitive connection it establishes.
The notion of content has been the subject of much discussion and controversy, but for present purposes I want to focus primarily on a distinction between two fundamentally different types of content - conceptual content versus nonconceptual content. Contents that are conceptual are available only to subjects who possess all the concepts required to specify them. To see the intuitive idea here, consider the absurdity of attributing to someone the thought that inflation lowers the purchasing power of money if they have no understanding of inflation, money, or purchasing power. Economic thinking is not available to creatures who lack the basic concepts of economics. Some theorists have taken the extreme view that all contents are conceptual, so that all capacities for representation are constrained by the concepts that the subject possesses. It has become increasingly popular, however, to hold that some contents are nonconceptual. Nonconceptual contents are ways of representing the world that can be had by, and attributed to, subjects that lack the concepts required canonically to specify them. We might use the concept prey, for example, to make sense of an animal's behavior, even though the animal might lack anything approaching mastery of that concept. We might do so in cases where an animal's behavior appears to have enough in common with behavior driven by conceptual thinking to be best explained through a mode of thinking that is a primitive precursor of that conceptual thinking.

