CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ONE, ATTY. UNTALAN CASE DIGEST (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ONE, ATTY. UNTALAN CASE DIGEST (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT)
One. Marcos versus Manglapuz, G.R. Number eight eight two one one, September fifteen, nineteen eighty-nine
After being ousted in nineteen eighty-six, former President Ferdinand Marcos and his family were in exile abroad and sought to return to the Philippines. President Corazon Aquino, through Executive Secretary Manglapus and other officials, refused to allow their return and the issuance of travel documents, saying their homecoming could threaten national security and public order. The Marcoses went to the Supreme Court via mandamus/prohibition, claiming constitutional rights (due process/right to travel/return).
Issue: whether the President has power to bar their return.
Issue: whether the President has power to bar their return.
Ruling: the Court sustained the President-this was not something resolved by looking only at liberty of abode/right to travel, because the situation was extraordinary and implicated the President's duty to protect the general welfare; the President may rely on residual/unstated powers implicit in the executive function to safeguard national interest, and courts review only for grave abuse of discretion. Finding factual bases for the President's security assessment, the Court would not supplant executive judgment and thus denied the petition.
Doctrine: the President has implied/residual powers to act for national security/general welfare even if not expressly enumerated, and the Court will not interfere absent arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion.
Two. Laurel versus Garcia, G.R. Number nine two zero one three, July twenty-five, nineteen ninety
FACTS (quick flow): The case involved the government's planned sale of a Philippine property in Roppongi, Japan (used for official/diplomatic purposes). Petitioners (including Senator Laurel) challenged the Executive's move to dispose of it, arguing it was property of public dominion and could not be sold just because the government allegedly no longer needed it. The dispute centered on whether the property had legally become alienable (i.e., converted into patrimonial property) and whether the Executive could sell it without Congress.
ISSUE: Can the Executive sell the Roppongi property without (one) a formal act withdrawing it from public use (public dominion) and (two) legislative authority authorizing its sale?
RULING: No. The Court held the property remained property of public dominion, so it was not for sale unless it is first formally withdrawn/abandoned from public use by a proper act (not mere non-use or intention), and there must be legislative authority allowing the sale. Without these, the proposed disposition is invalid.
DOCTRINE (recit-ready): Government property devoted to public service (including diplomatic/official use abroad) is property of public dominion and is outside commerce; it does not become patrimonial just because the Executive wants to sell it or claims it is unused. To validly sell it, there must be (a) a definite act withdrawing it from public use (abandonment/withdrawal) and (b) a law or legislative authority authorizing the sale.
Three. Brillantes versus COMELEC, G.R. Number one six three five five six, June eight, two thousand four
FACTS: In the two thousand four national elections, COMELEC issued a resolution creating an "electronic transmission and consolidation of advanced results," basically an unofficial quick count that would electronically transmit and tally partial "advance results" for public viewing. Brillantes, as voter and taxpayer, went to the Supreme Court and argued COMELEC had no constitutional or statutory authority to conduct this kind of unofficial canvass, and that using public money for it was also illegal.