Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, et al.

Chapter 1

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,

versus

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J .:

The constitutionality of Sections four and seven of Republic Act Number eighty-two forty-nine - an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan - is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, JR., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases Numbers two three zero four seven to two three zero five seven (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:

In the early morning of May eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five, eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group headed by Chief

Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police. The Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, JR.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission - Task Force Habagat headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of Police Officer two Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired at dawn of May eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the Philippine National Police officers and personnel allegedly involved in May eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November second, nineteen ninety-five, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven informations for murder before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, JR. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the eleven informations, the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March first, nineteen ninety-six eleven amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, JR. and others. One of the accused was dropped from the case.

On March fifth to sixth, nineteen ninety-six, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section two (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act Number seven nine seven five. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade twenty-seven or higher, or Philippine National Police officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least Salary Grade twenty-seven.

Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May eighth, nineteen ninety-six (promulgated on May ninth, nineteen ninety-six), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. seven nine seven five, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

On May seventeenth, nineteen ninety-six, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.

While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March first, nineteen ninety-six, House Bill Number two two nine nine one zero and Number one zero nine four one one (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales two, respectively), as well as Senate Bill Number eight four four two (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section two (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. Number seven nine seven five.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. Number eighty-two forty-nine by the President of the Philippines on February fifth, nineteen ninety-seven.

Subsequently, on March fifth, nineteen ninety-seven, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May eighth, nineteen ninety-six."

On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March fifth, nineteen ninety-seven Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, JR. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act eighty-two forty-nine and the President of the Philippines approved it on February fifth, nineteen ninety-seven. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases - in fact, no order of arrest has been issued - this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of three of two, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of four with one neither concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section four of R.A. Number eighty-four forty-nine, including Section seven thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:

a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law.

b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section seven, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Numbers two three zero four seven to two three zero five seven to procedural due process.

c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections four and seven which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law, thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section twenty-six of Article six of the Constitution.

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act Number eighty-four forty-nine innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section four and seven in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. They further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. seven nine seven five, before recourse to the Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.

This Court then issued a Resolution requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Numbers two three zero four seven to two three zero five seven sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section four B of Republic Act Number eighty-four forty-nine, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section five, Article thirteen of the nineteen seventy-three Constitution, which provides:

Section five. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as

Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.

The said special court is retained in the new nineteen eighty-seven Constitution under the following provisions in Article eleven, Section four:

Section four. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree Number fourteen eighty-two created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. Number sixteen zero six, Section twenty of Batas Pambansa Number one twenty-three, P.D. Number eighteen sixty, P.D. Number eighteen sixty-one, R.A. Number seven nine seven five, and R.A. Number eight four four nine. Under the latest amendments introduced by Section four of R.A. Number eight four four nine, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

Section four. Section four of the same decree [P.D. Number sixteen zero six, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Section four. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act Number three zero one nine, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act Number one three seven nine, and Chapter two, Section two, Title seven, Book two of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(one) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "twenty-seven" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of nineteen eighty-nine (Republic Act Number six seven five eight), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(two) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "twenty-seven" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of nineteen eighty-nine;

(three) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(four) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(five) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "twenty-seven" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of nineteen eighty-nine.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Numbers one, two, fourteen and fourteen-A, issued in nineteen eighty-six.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "twenty-seven" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act six thousand seven hundred fifty-eight, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. one hundred twenty-nine, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Numbers one, two, fourteen and fourteen-A, issued in nineteen eighty-six: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. one hundred twenty-nine, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Numbers one, two, fourteen, and four-A, issued in nineteen eighty-six.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

XXX XXX XXX (Emphasis supplied)

Section seven of R.A. Number eight thousand two hundred forty-nine states:

Section seven. Transitory provision - This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. eight thousand seven hundred seventy-five was R.A. eight thousand seven hundred seventy-five. Section two of R.A. eight thousand seven hundred seventy-five provides:

Section two. Section four of the same decree [Presidential Decree Number one thousand six hundred six, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Section four. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act Number three thousand nineteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act Number one thousand three hundred seventy-nine, and Chapter two, Section two, Title seven, Book two of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(one) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "twenty-seven" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of nineteen eighty-nine (Republic Act Number six thousand seven hundred fifty-eight), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(two) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "twenty-seven" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of nineteen eighty-nine;

(three) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(four) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(five) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "twenty-seven" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of nineteen eighty-nine.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Numbers one, two, fourteen, and four-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "twenty-seven" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act six thousand seven hundred fifty-eight, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. one hundred twenty-nine.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "twenty-seven," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.

XXX XXX XXX (Emphasis supplied)

Section seven of R.A. Number eight thousand seven hundred seventy-five reads:

Section seven. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

Under paragraphs a and c, Section four of R.A. eight two four nine, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section two (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. seven nine seven five, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. seven nine seven five, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. eight two four nine.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section four of R.A. eight two four nine reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: one, the offense committed is a violation of R.A. three zero one nine, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), two, R.A. one three seven nine (the law on ill-gotten wealth), three, Chapter two, Section two, Title seven, Book two of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), or four, Executive Order numbers one, two, fourteen, and fourteen-A, issued in nineteen eighty-six (sequestration cases), or five, other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; two, the offender committing the offenses in items one, two, three and five is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section four; and three, the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title eight of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section four of R.A. eight two four nine. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of Section four, R.A. eight two four nine, in relation to their office." The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender - that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section four. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section four do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. eight two four nine, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. one six zero six which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner and intervenors' posture that Section four and seven of R.A. eight two four nine violate their right to equal protection of the law because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:

one, it must rest on substantial distinction;

two, it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

three, must not be limited to existing conditions only, and four, must apply equally to all members of the same class,

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections four and seven of R.A. eight two four nine failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. eight two four nine, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections four and seven placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section four provides that it shall apply to "all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section seven, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section seven of the new law (R.A. eight two four nine).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the sixty-seven million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section four of P.D. one six zero six, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. eight two four nine. R.A eight two four nine, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by twenty-three other Senators and by about two hundred fifty Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. eight two four nine to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. seven nine seven five.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. eight two four nine.

In Calder against Bull, an ex post facto law is one -

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant.

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty.

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. eight two four nine is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. seven nine seven five, which amended P.D. one six zero six as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. eight two four nine cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Petitioner's and intervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. seven nine seven five has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. eight two four nine, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. eight two four nine pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.

In any case; R.A. eight two four nine has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. eight two four nine expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. one six zero six, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section two, Article eight of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section four and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section seven of R.A. No. eight two four nine, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and intervenors.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section four [paragraph b] of R.A. eight two four nine. Section four requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section five, Article thirteen of the nineteen seventy-three Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new nineteen eighty-seven Constitution when it declared in Section four thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.

In People against Montejo, we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations."

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section nine, Rule one hundred ten of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

Section nine Course of accusation - The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.

As early as nineteen fifty-four we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in United States versus Karelsen:

The object of this written accusations was - First; To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation or connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.

In the present case, one of the eleven amended informations for murder reads:

AMENDED INFORMATIONS

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer Three. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO Three, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO

GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article two hundred forty-eight of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows

That on or about May eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO Two, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there was no arrest made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five.