Reframing Affective Injustice: On the Right to Anger and the Priority of Moral Reasons

Reframing Affective Injustice: On the Right to Anger and the Priority of Moral Reasons

Abstract

This paper responds to the dilemma of affective injustice by distinguishing between three forms of anger and recommending a model of virtuous anger the expression of which is consistent with the productive pursuit of justice. It argues that anger may in the first instance be either passive or active, that is, a passive affective register and morally inert experience, or something that is manifest in action towards other agents. Active anger may then be grounded in moral norms, or not. Anger that is properly grounded and guided by morality is consistent with virtuous agency and the productive pursuit of moral ends. In constructing this model of anger we draw inspiration from the Kantian account of virtue. We argue that this model provides a sound structure for morally productive anger while remaining vigilant towards anger's darker possibilities. To demonstrate the comparative strength of this model, we outline some challenges with the idea of apt anger, arguing that moral norms and constraints are better suited to guide our evaluation of anger. We apply this model to educational settings, where we argue that it is beneficial to channel anger through moral norms, rather than attempt to calibrate its proper magnitude. All things considered, the moral status of anger is equivocal: it can both aid and hinder the pursuit of justice, so it is best to take a cautious while permissive stance towards its use in our common life.

Introduction

Anger is an entirely natural and seemingly appropriate response to many forms of wrongdoing. This may be the case even where the expression of that anger hinders one's ability to address or resolve the wrongdoing in question. The claim that anger ought to be avoided because it is counterproductive to resolving wrongdoing and achieving just outcomes is referred to as the counterproductivity critique. When directed towards those who have good reason to be angry, the counterproductivity critique can imply a difficult choice: does one choose to be angry when anger is an apt emotional response to injustice, or does one forego one's anger for the sake of correcting the injustice? This dilemma is at the heart of the problem of affective injustice as described by Amia Srinivasan. The injustice, according to Srinivasan, lies primarily in forcing one to choose between getting aptly angry and acting prudentially in pursuit of justice. That is, in appreciating the world as it is or making the world as it should be. Affective injustice has otherwise been identified with an interlocutor's refusal to be appropriately moved by the apt anger of another, an inappropriate extrinsic demand for emotion regulation, and a deprivation of affective goods that one is owed. In this paper, we focus on Srinivasan's definition and the associated counterproductivity critique. We argue that the discussion surrounding affective injustice is better framed in terms of moral reasons, motivations, and rights. We seek to deflate the dilemma while affirming the intuition behind it-that one is entitled to express anger in response to wrongdoing-without granting anger too prominent a role in interpersonal discourse.

On the face of it, the notion of affective injustice might seem clear enough, but on closer examination there are a variety of complex questions associated with how it is defined and consequently addressed. Among these are important questions about the nature of anger. How does one know when one's anger or that of another is apt, should a disposition to be (aptly) angry be cultivated, and how angry should the ideal moral agent be? As we argue below, there is good reason to be skeptical about the moral value of anger, but it does not follow from this that feelings or expressions of anger should necessarily be subdued where they occur. We distinguish between three types of anger: passive anger that is morally inert, active anger that is morally grounded, and active anger that is not morally grounded or that is unconstrained. We then argue in favour of a privilege-based right to have and express the first two forms of anger. Yet one may have a right to express anger while at the same time wrongdoing can be understood and its status qua wrong communicated without anger. Anger should not stand in for moral reasoning and action, which does the deeper work in addressing conditions of injustice. These conditions are the root cause of affective injustice and as such are what ultimately need to be corrected. This can be done either with or without anger and it may be the case that anger is unhelpful in making this correction. Anger in itself is morally ambivalent: it may align with a righteous cause yet can easily lead an agent astray, so it is reasonable to be both skeptical and cautiously permissive about its place in moral agency. This suggests that there is some truth in the counterproductivity critique, which can be understood in more than one way.

In section one of this paper, we outline the three forms of anger mentioned above. Following that, we raise questions concerning the aptness of anger, suggesting there is reason to reject this mode of classification. Anger is natural and may be morally permitted, even useful, but it is more difficult to say that it can be apt. In section two, we articulate what moral anger might look like on a Kantian account of moral agency and norms, which we believe best frames the discussion surrounding affective injustice. We suggest that anger is consistent with virtuous agency where it is grounded in moral principles and governed by an agent's choice (self-control) alongside self-knowledge and sympathy, key Kantian virtues. This responds to the Stoic concern that expressions of anger are often unwieldy and unproductive, without requiring that anger be eliminated from an individual's psychology or its expressions from a community's discourse. In section three, we address the question of how anger might be educated given its delicate status as a natural and prima facie justified while at times unhelpful and even harmful emotion that one is entitled to. We argue that the Kantian model developed in section two is well suited to guide the process of educating anger and we discuss some examples that demonstrate why. Its success in this practical application lends plausibility to the case that this model articulates a sound structure for anger that is morally productive and consistent with virtuous agency. Though if the same ends can be achieved without anger, there is, all things considered, less reason to be angry. Further, if being angry risks not achieving, or violating, moral ends, then there are additional reasons to not be angry. So, while one is entitled to one's anger and should not be silenced for expressing it, it is still probably better all things considered to cultivate it away.