Chapter 1
Chapter 1
Unclear by Design? Strategic Ambiguity and Ireland's Military Neutrality Policy. In the wake of the Swedish and Finnish governments' decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, in 2022, Ireland has attracted renewed attention as one of the few European Union, EU, member states that continue to describe themselves as militarily neutral. The Irish government defines its policy of military neutrality as being 'characterised by non-membership in military alliances or common or mutual defence arrangements', . It has been a central feature of Irish foreign policy since the Second World War and remains politically popular. An April 2025 poll found that 63% of respondents supported Ireland's current model of military neutrality . Despite the policy's prominence, its formulation conceals an important puzzle. The terms 'military alliances' and common or mutual defence arrangements' do not unequivocally establish which forms of international defence cooperation Ireland is and is not permitted to engage in. 'Military alliances' is left under-defined, allowing room for participation in alliance-like defence relationships, while the exclusion of common or mutual defence arrangements' appears categorical but leaves space for unilateral forms of defence cooperation.
Why has such an important aspect of Irish foreign policy been formulated in terms that leave its meaning and boundaries open to interpretation, and what political functions might this formulation plausibly serve? This study proposes answers to these questions grounded in the concept of strategic ambiguity: governmental discourse about Ireland's military neutrality policy displays intentional, recurrent, structurally similar patterns of ambiguous language, supported by efforts to maintain selective opacity about some of
Ireland's most significant international defence relationships ; . Rather than treating the presence of ambiguity as sufficient evidence of deliberate design, this study evaluates whether recurrent patterns in official discourse about the policy are consistent with a strategic ambiguity interpretation, assesses whether strategic ambiguity provides a more plausible explanation than the notion that the ambiguous formulation is primarily due to accidental imprecision, and considers the explanatory contributions of alternative, potentially complementary accounts provided by path-dependent domestic entrenchment and discursive contestation interpretations of Irish neutrality ; . It also evaluates whether ambiguity about Ireland's military neutrality policy serves useful political functions, including helping the Irish government preserve its policy flexibility, avoid some of the costs associated with a more explicit security posture, and satisfice the competing preferences of multiple audiences.
This study finds substantial, though inferential, support for the claim that governmental discourse about Ireland's military neutrality policy displays intentional, recurrent, structurally similar patterns of ambiguous language and selective opacity . The official formulation frames its two core components, non-membership in military alliances and non-membership in common or mutual defence arrangements, in ways that preserve more than one plausible interpretation of Ireland's alignment status. This ambiguity is reinforced by governmental reluctance to specify the nature and scope of a reported United Kingdom, UK, and Ireland air defence arrangement and the implications of Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, TEU, for Irish national defence ; . It also finds substantial, though inferential, support for ambiguity's expected flexibility-preserving and domestic audience management functions but only partial support for its expected relationship with material cost avoidance. Among the alternative explanations, accidental imprecision receives little support, while path-dependent domestic entrenchment and discursive contestation receive partial support and are found to complement the strategic ambiguity interpretation of Irish military neutrality .
The literature attempting to explain the nature of contemporary Irish neutrality falls into two main strands. The first, which may be labelled the domestic entrenchment' interpretation, explains the persistence of military neutrality through path dependency and domestic political constraints. Neal Jesse emphasises the reinforcing pressures imposed by pro-neutrality domestic political and bureaucratic actors and public opinion . Andrew Cottey argues that neutrality's deep political entrenchment in Ireland has constrained fundamental policy change even as Irish governments have adapted to greater security cooperation through NATO's Partnership for Peace (P F P) and the E U . Although these accounts primarily explain policy continuity and adaptation, rather than governmental discourse, they also suggest that governments may reproduce inherited understandings of military neutrality while adapting to evolving international security practices.
A second strand, which may be labelled the 'discursive contestation' interpretation, focuses on political struggles over the meaning of Irish neutrality. Karen Devine conceptualises Irish neutrality as a 'floating signifier' whose content is contested between elite 'military' and public 'active' conceptions of neutrality that embody competing foreign policy agendas . Her analysis also examines elite redefinitions of neutrality and discursive strategies, including vague formulations, 'doublespeak', and 'meaningful silences', through which governments have sought to reconcile European security and defence integration with continuing public attachment to neutrality .
These studies demonstrate that neutrality is both institutionally entrenched and discursively contested, and Devine's analysis recognises communicative practices resembling those examined here. A central contribution of the present study is to identify recurrent patterns in the use of ambiguous language and selective opacity across governments, officials, and documents to help explain the particular structure and potential political functions of Ireland's military neutrality policy.
Strategic ambiguity has been examined across multiple security contexts. Antoine Rayroux shows how certain E U governments use ambiguous language to present the E U's Common Security and Defence Policy (C S D P) as consistent with distinct national foreign policy traditions, such as exceptionalism in France and neutrality in Ireland, thereby building domestic support for it . Yoel Cohen examines the maintenance of nuclear ambiguity in Israel . Susanne Therese Hansen explores how ambiguity can obscure obligations and distribute costs in the context of a multilateral arms export control regime . Wen-Chin Wu and colleagues examine how ambiguous American military signalling shapes Taiwanese and Chinese perceptions of potential United States
(U S) military assistance and support for Taiwan's independence . Finally, Michelle Bentley demonstrates how governments have employed ambiguity in relation to their chemical weapons policies during the Russo-Ukrainian War .
These studies demonstrate that strategic ambiguity is not peculiar to Irish military neutrality and also reveal that the subject of ambiguity can vary considerably across cases – from uncertainty about capabilities, to uncertainty about future responses, to uncertainty about the meaning of existing commitments. The present study builds on this literature by examining whether observed patterns in Irish governmental discourse are consistent with the strategic use of ambiguous language and selective opacity to support a core aspect of any state's foreign policy – its alignment status.
The present study also intersects with scholarly debates on alliance politics. James Morrow argues that international defence relationships do not always conform to a binary distinction between alliance membership and non-alignment . Anna Wieslander, similarly, identifies a gray zone' occupied by informal allies', meaning states that are not bound by clear treaty-based commitments but are still expected to coordinate the use of their armed forces during a major crisis or war or to confront threats collectively . Sweden exemplified this distinction before joining NATO, combining formal non-alignment with extensive military cooperation and contingency planning . These studies caution against treating neutrality, alliance membership, and non-alignment as mutually exclusive or entirely fixed categories. They also suggest that the Irish case forms part of a wider phenomenon in which the rhetorical status of a defence relationship may diverge from its practical content. Another contribution of the present study is to demonstrate how strategic ambiguity can serve as a politically useful communicative mechanism through which such divergence may be sustained.
The present study also speaks to the literature on small-state security shelter theory, which suggests that small states seek support from larger states and institutions to offset security vulnerabilities but may, thereby, incur significant costs . As discussed later in the present study, this tension can create incentives for ambiguity about alignment because the governments of small neutral states, like Ireland, Austria, and Switzerland or, formerly, Finland and Sweden, may seek to benefit from external military cooperation while limiting some of the political or material costs that could be incurred by explicitly acknowledging an unequivocal alliance posture.
The present study's focus on the political construction of a policy's meaning and boundaries also connects the Irish case to the wider literature on strategic narratives in international relations. Roselle et al. argue that strategic narratives provide a means of understanding how political actors seek to shape meaning and influence in international politics . From this perspective, the Irish government's discourse about military neutrality' can be understood as part of a broader effort to sustain a recognisable account of the state's international identity while accommodating practices that complicate that narrative. The present study builds on these insights. It conceptualises ambiguous language and selective opacity specifically as mechanisms of strategic ambiguity and examines the political advantages that governments may derive from preserving multiple plausible interpretations of a core component of their foreign policy.
The next section of this study conceptualises strategic ambiguity and its operating mechanisms before setting out the theoretical expectations, alternative explanations, and methodological approach used to evaluate them. It then examines patterns of selective opacity surrounding some of Ireland's most significant defence relationships and ambiguity in the official formulation of Ireland's military neutrality policy, assessing their consistency with the strategic ambiguity interpretation as well as the alternative explanations. The analysis next considers the potential political utility of ambiguity. A subsequent comparative discussion distinguishes different forms of strategic ambiguity and identifies general scope conditions under which this approach may operate beyond Ireland. The conclusion evaluates the findings, considers the democratic and strategic costs of ambiguity, and assesses greater disclosure as a possible alternative approach.
Theoretical Expectations and Alternative Explanations
Theoretical Expectations and Alternative Explanations
Ambiguity denotes the existence of more than one plausible meaning for the same word, phrase, policy, or legal formulation ; . Strategic ambiguity is a more specific phenomenon. It refers to the intentional use of language by political actors to preserve multiple reasonable interpretations of a subject for the purposes of securing practical advantages . In his work on organisational communication and management, Eric Eisenberg defines the concept as 'instances where individuals use ambiguity purposefully to accomplish their goals' . Strategic ambiguity should, therefore, be distinguished from mere imprecision or careless drafting. The crucial point is not simply that an ambiguous statement is unclear, but that its lack of clarity is deliberate and useful to the speaker .
Strategic ambiguity operates through two mutually reinforcing mechanisms: selective opacity and ambiguous language. Selective opacity restricts access to information that could resolve uncertainty about a subject ; . Ambiguous language, by contrast, is discourse that preserves more than one plausible interpretation of a subject ; . These mechanisms work together. Selective opacity can deny audiences the information needed to arrive at a settled understanding of a subject, while ambiguous language enables multiple audiences to maintain different, though still plausible, interpretations of a subject's meaning and boundaries. Strategic ambiguity does not require outright deception or complete secrecy. Instead, it rests on the preservation of interpretive latitude.
This study distinguishes four observable features through which strategic ambiguity's operating mechanisms may be assessed. The first three concern aspects of ambiguous language ; . First, under-definition is the recurrent use of consequential terms about a subject without an authoritative definition capable of clearly delimiting their scope. Second, rhetorical narrowing occurs when a specific, limited example of a subject is used to characterise and represent the subject as a whole. Third, selective qualification occurs when wording excludes certain aspects of a subject more clearly than others. Finally, the fourth feature, selective opacity, involves non- or qualified acknowledgements of information about a subject, withholding of substantive information about a subject, or refusals to clarify information about a subject ; .
No single feature is treated as evidence of intentional strategic ambiguity. The strategic ambiguity interpretation becomes more plausible when several of these features recur across officials, governments, documents, and political and security contexts; exhibit a similar structure; persist despite opportunities for authoritative clarification; and concern politically consequential subjects in which maintaining interpretive flexibility may offer practical advantages. This methodological approach cannot directly observe policymakers' private intentions. Accordingly, claims about intentionality are inferred rather than demonstrated. In this study, intentionality is inferred from the presence of recurrent, structurally similar patterns of ambiguity and selective opacity across multiple governments, officials, documents, and political and security contexts, rather than from any single statement taken in isolation.
Strategic ambiguity can function as a political resource by supporting the coexistence of multiple interpretations of a subject that would be more difficult to sustain if the subject were discussed using transparent language ( ; ). It may, for instance, help preserve a government's freedom of action and potentially limit a government's material costs ( ; ). It may also help a government reconcile the competing policy preferences held by different audiences by allowing each audience to sustain a different,
plausible, and at least somewhat positive interpretation of the same subject ( ). Evidence of utility is not treated as definitive evidence of strategic intention. Unclear language, even if useful, could be the product of unintentionally vague wording ( ). Evidence demonstrating both recurrent, structurally similar ambiguity and its potential political utility to the communicators would, however, strengthen the plausibility of a strategic ambiguity interpretation.
The following theoretical expectations identify the observable features and potential political functions of strategic ambiguity and a range of potential alternative interpretations. The first concerns the recurrence and structure of strategic ambiguity. If ambiguous formulations arise mainly from rhetorical error or individual officeholders' idiosyncratic choices, their content should vary across governments, officials, documents, and contexts. In contrast, if ambiguity is intentional and serves practical political purposes, similar patterns should recur despite changes in governments, officeholders, foreign policy documents, and circumstances ( ; ). For the same reasons, structurally similar forms of selective opacity about the subject of ambiguity should, likewise, recur across governments, officials, and documents over time. This leads to the first expectation:
E1: If ambiguity is intentional and performs a political function, official descriptions of military neutrality should display recurrent, structurally similar forms of ambiguous language and selective opacity across governments, officials, documents, and political and security contexts.
Recurrence alone cannot establish that ambiguity is strategically useful. It is also necessary to consider how ambiguity may assist a government and what could be lost if a government adopted a more transparent policy formulation ( ). An unequivocal acceptance or rejection of international defence arrangements could constrain governmental discretion by placing clear limits on the forms of international defence cooperation it can choose to engage in. Greater clarification could also generate pressure to accept additional material costs, either through greater investment in autonomous defence capabilities or through adherence to the spending expectations associated with formal membership in a military alliance or mutual defence pact. This gives rise to the second and third expectations:
E2: If ambiguity performs a political function, it should persist around policy boundaries where greater clarification could constrain a government's flexibility.
E3: If ambiguity performs a political function, it should persist around policy boundaries where greater clarification could impose material costs.
A further expectation concerns neutrality's domestic political significance. Polling indicates that, while neutrality is favoured by a majority of Ireland's population, a substantial portion of its residents support the prospect of joining NATO or increasing cooperation in defence matters at the EU level ( ;
). In a political and security context like contemporary Ireland, ambiguity may allow governments to satisfice the competing preferences of multiple audiences by using language that can be plausibly interpreted as favourable towards neutrality while also preserving interpretive latitude around international defence cooperation. This leads to the fourth expectation:
E4: If ambiguity performs a political function, it should persist around policy boundaries where greater clarification could make it more difficult for a government to satisfice the competing preferences of multiple audiences.
These expectations must be evaluated against alternative explanations. First, accidental imprecision attributes ambiguous official language to loose terminology or inconsistent drafting rather than policymakers' deliberate choices ( ; ). This leads to the first alternative expectation:
E5: If ambiguity primarily arises from accidental imprecision, official descriptions of military neutrality should be irregular and idiosyncratic, varying substantially across governments, officials, documents, and political and security contexts.
Path-dependent domestic entrenchment offers another potential alternative. Jesse emphasises the role of domestic political actors, public opinion, and governmental institutions in sustaining Ireland's military neutrality policy, while Cottey demonstrates how its political entrenchment has constrained fundamental policy change without preventing incremental adaptation to international security cooperation ( ; ). Although these accounts primarily explain the persistence and evolution of the policy, rather than the structure of governmental discourse, they also suggest that governments may continue to reproduce inherited language concerning military neutrality while accommodating changes in international security practices. This leads to a second alternative expectation:
E6: If official policy discourse primarily reflects path-dependent domestic entrenchment, it should reproduce inherited formulations of military neutrality, with changes in how the policy is characterised occurring mainly through incremental accommodation to evolving security circumstances.
Discursive contestation offers still another alternative. Devine demonstrates that competing elite and public understandings of neutrality have persisted within Irish politics and that governments have actively participated in this contest over meaning through redefinition, vague formulations, 'doublespeak', and 'meaningful silences' surrounding European security and defence integration ( ). Her analysis suggests that governmental discourse may reflect efforts to promote particular understandings of neutrality, reconcile competing political preferences, and accommodate developments in international security and defence cooperation through changes in how the policy is characterised. This leads to a third alternative expectation:
E7: If official policy discourse primarily reflects discursive contestation over the meaning of neutrality, governmental descriptions of the policy should exhibit redefinitions, vague formulations, doublespeak, and/or meaningful silences associated with efforts to reconcile competing understandings of neutrality and developments in international security and defence cooperation.
To evaluate these expectations, this study undertakes a qualitative, theory-oriented, single-case discursive analysis of Irish foreign-policy documents and the statements of senior Irish foreign policymakers, particularly taoisigh (prime ministers), tanaistí (deputy prime ministers), and ministers for foreign affairs and defence. Unlike Austria and Switzerland, Ireland has not enshrined its neutrality in a constitution or treaty, allowing Irish governments a comparatively high degree of discretion to articulate and interpret it through official discourse. The Irish case is, therefore, selected primarily for analytical leverage, not representativeness. Nevertheless, it holds considerable potential to illuminate strategic ambiguity's general operating mechanisms as well as scope conditions under which using strategic ambiguity should be particularly attractive to other governments.
This study's empirical focus is the language that the Irish government uses to describe the state's military neutrality policy and international defence relationships. By treating official language not as a secondary reflection of policy, but as a site in which a policy's meaning is constructed and disseminated, this study can examine how ambiguity operates in foreign policy discourse . The principal empirical corpus comprises official policy documents, parliamentary debates and written answers, committee proceedings, official statements, and attributable public comments. The analysis focuses on statements that discuss military neutrality, military alliances, and other international defence arrangements, assess the compatibility of security cooperation with neutrality, or respond to requests for clarification about the reported UK-Ireland air defence arrangement and Article 42.7 of the T E U. Published reporting and UK parliamentary statements provide contextual evidence about the UK–Ireland air defence arrangement but are not treated as observations of Irish governmental discourse. The unit of analysis is the pattern of governmental discourse about these subjects. Individual verbal and written statements provide observations through which the recurrence and structure of this pattern can be examined.
The analysis focuses principally on the 2015 to 2026 period for both substantive and methodological reasons. This period encompasses significant changes in the European security environment, notably Brexit, the expansion of E U security and defence cooperation, and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These developments provide a helpful context in which to assess whether governmental discourse about military neutrality has remained consistent despite changing external circumstances. The period also encompasses successive governments and changes in senior officeholders, allowing the analysis to assess whether ambiguous language and rhetorical attempts to maintain selective opacity recur across different political leaderships rather than reflecting the idiosyncratic rhetorical preferences of particular individuals. Earlier material is included where necessary to trace the origins or continuity of relevant formulations and defence arrangements. 2015 is a boundary for this analysis, not a claim about when ambiguity about Irish military neutrality began. Against this theoretical and methodological background, this study now analyses how selective opacity and ambiguous language may contribute to the preservation of uncertainty about the meaning and boundaries of Ireland's military neutrality policy.

