An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism
An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism
One point one. Introduction
Political economists have always been interested in the differences in economic and political institutions that occur across countries. Some regard these differences as deviations from 'best practice' that will dissolve as nations catch up to a technological or organizational leader. Others see them as the distillation of more durable historical choices for a specific kind of society, since economic institutions condition levels of social protection, the distribution of income, and the availability of collective goods-features of the social solidarity of a nation. In each case, comparative political economy revolves around the conceptual frameworks used to understand institutional variation across nations.
On such frameworks depend the answers to a range of important questions. Some are policy-related. What kind of economic policies will improve the performance of the economy? What will governments do in the face of economic challenges? What defines a state's capacities to meet such challenges? Other questions are firm-related. Do companies located in different nations display systematic differences in their structure and strategies? If so, what inspires such differences? How can national differences in the pace or character of innovation be explained? Some are issues about economic performance. Do some sets of institutions provide lower rates of inflation and unemployment or higher rates of growth than others? What are the trade-offs in terms of economic performance to developing one type of political economy rather than another? Finally, second-order questions about institutional change and stability are of special significance today. Can we expect technological progress and the competitive pressures of globalization to inspire institutional convergence? What factors condition the adjustment paths a political economy takes in the face of such challenges?
The object of this book is to elaborate a new framework for understanding the institutional similarities and differences among the developed economies, one that offers a new and intriguing set of answers to such questions. We outline the basic approach in this Introduction. Subsequent chapters extend and apply it to a wide range of issues. In many respects, this approach is still a work-in-progress. We see it as a set of contentions that open up new research agendas rather than settled wisdom to be accepted uncritically, but, as the contributions to this volume indicate, it opens up new perspectives on an unusually broad set of topics, ranging from issues in innovation, vocational training, and corporate strategy to those associated with legal systems, the development of social policy, and the stance nations take in international negotiations.
As any work on this topic must be, ours is deeply indebted to prior scholarship in the field. The 'varieties of capitalism' approach developed here can be seen as an effort to go beyond three perspectives on institutional variation that have dominated the study of comparative capitalism in the preceding thirty years. In important respects, like ours, each of these perspectives was a response to the economic problems of its time.
The first of these perspectives offers a modernization approach to comparative capitalism nicely elucidated in Shonfield's magisterial treatise of nineteen sixty-five. Devised in the post-war decades, this approach saw the principal challenge confronting the developed economies as one of modernizing industries still dominated by pre-war practices in order to secure high rates of national growth. Analysts tried to identify a set of actors with the strategic capacity to devise plans for industry and to impress them on specific sectors. Occasionally, this capacity was said to reside in the banks but more often in public officials. Accordingly, those taking this approach focused on the institutional structures that gave states leverage over the private sector, such as planning systems and public influence over the flows of funds in the financial system. Countries were often categorized, according to the structure of their state, into those with 'strong' and 'weak' states. France and Japan emerged from this perspective as models of economic success, while Britain was generally seen as a laggard.
During the nineteen seventies, when inflation became the preeminent problem facing the developed economies, a number of analysts developed a second approach to comparative capitalism based on the concept of neo-corporatism. Although defined in various ways, neo-corporatism was generally associated with the capacity of a state to negotiate durable bargains with employers and the trade union movement regarding wages, working conditions, and social or economic policy. Accordingly, a nation's capacity for neo-corporatism was generally said to depend on the centralization or concentration of the trade union movement, following an Olsonian logic of collective action which specifies that more encompassing unions can better internalize the economic effects of their wage settlements. Those who saw neo-corporatist bargains as a 'political exchange' emphasized the ability of states to offer inducements as well as the capacity of unions to discipline their members. Those working from this perspective categorized countries largely by reference to the organization of their trade union movement; and the success stories of this literature were the small, open economies of northern Europe.
During the nineteen eighties and nineteen nineties, a new approach to comparative capitalism that we will term a social systems of production approach gained currency. Under this rubric, we group analyses of sectoral governance, national innovation systems, and flexible production regimes that are diverse in some respects but united by several key analytic features. Responding to the reorganization of production in response to technological change, these works devote more attention to the behavior of firms. Influenced by the French regulation school, they emphasize the movement of firms away from mass production toward new production regimes that depend on collective institutions at the regional, sectoral, or national level. These works bring a wider range of institutions into the analysis and adopt a more sociological approach to their operation, stressing the ways in which institutions generate trust or enhance learning within economic communities. As a result, some of these works resist national categories in favor of an emphasis on regional success of the sort found in Baden-Württemberg and the Third Italy.
Each of these bodies of work explains important aspects of the economic world. However, we seek to go beyond them in several respects. Although those who wrote within it characterized national differences in the early post-war era well, for instance, some versions of the modernization approach tend to overstate what governments can accomplish, especially in contexts of economic openness where adjustment is firm-led. We will argue that features of states once seen as attributes of strength actually make the implementation of many economics policies more difficult; and we seek a basis for comparison more deeply rooted in the organization of the private sector.
Neo-corporatist analysis directs our attention to the organization of society, but its emphasis on the trade union movement underplays the role that firms and employer organizations play in the coordination of the economy. We want to bring firms back into the center of the analysis of comparative capitalism and, without neglecting trade unions, highlight the role that business associations and other types of relationships among firms play in the political economy.
The literature on social systems of production accords firms a central role and links the organization of production to the support provided by external institutions at many levels of the political economy. However, without denying that regional or sectoral institutions matter to firm behavior, we focus on variation among national political economies. Our premiss is that many of the most important institutional structures- notably systems of labor market regulation, of education and training, and of corporate governance-depend on the presence of regulatory regimes that are the preserve of the nation-state. Accordingly, we look for national-level differences and terms in which to characterize them that are more general or parsimonious than this literature has generated.
Where we break most fundamentally from these approaches, however, is in our conception of how behavior is affected by the institutions of the political economy. Three frameworks for understanding this relationship dominate the analysis of comparative capitalism. One sees institutions as socializing agencies that instill a particular set of norms or attitudes in those who operate within them. French civil servants, for instance, are said to acquire a particular concern for the public interest by virtue of their training or the ethos of their agencies. A second suggests that the effects of an institution follow from the power it confers on particular actors through the formal sanctions that hierarchy supplies or the resources an institution provides for mobilization. Industrial policy-makers and trade union leaders are often said to have such forms of power. A third framework construes the institutions of the political economy as a matrix of sanctions and incentives to which the relevant actors respond such that behavior can be predicted more or less automatically from the presence of specific institutions, as, for instance, when individuals refuse to provide public goods in the absence of selective incentives. This kind of logic is often cited to explain the willingness of encompassing trade unions to moderate wages in order to reduce inflation.
Each of these formulations captures important ways in which the institutions of the political economy affect economic behavior and we make use of them. However, we think these approaches tend to miss or model too incompletely the strategic interactions central to the behavior of economic actors. The importance of strategic interaction is increasingly appreciated by economists but still neglected in studies of comparative capitalism. If interaction of this sort is central to economic and political outcomes, the most important institutions distinguishing one political economy from another will be those conditioning such interaction, and it is these that we seek to capture in this analysis. For this purpose, we construe the key relationships in the political economy in game-theoretic terms and focus on the kinds of institutions that alter the outcomes of strategic interaction. This approach generates an analysis that focuses on some of the same institutions others have identified as important but construes the impact of those institutions differently as well as one that highlights other institutions not yet given enough attention in studies of comparative capitalism.
By locating the firm at the center of the analysis, we hope to build bridges between business studies and comparative political economy, two disciplines that are all too often disconnected. By integrating game-theoretic perspectives on the firm of the sort that are now central to microeconomics into an analysis of the macroeconomy, we attempt to connect the new microeconomics to important issues in macroeconomics
Ours is a framework that should be of interest to economists, scholars of business, and political scientists alike. We turn now to an elucidation of its basic elements.
One point two. The Basic Elements of the Approach
One point two. The Basic Elements of the Approach
This varieties of capitalism approach to the political economy is actor-centered, which is to say we see the political economy as a terrain populated by multiple actors, each of whom seeks to advance his interests in a rational way in strategic interaction with others. The relevant actors may be individuals, firms, producer groups, or governments. However, this is a firm-centered political economy that regards companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist economy. They are the key agents of adjustment in the face of technological change or international competition whose activities aggregate into overall levels of economic performance.