Aristotelian Flourishing and Contemporary Philosophical Theories of Wellbeing

Aristotelian Flourishing and Contemporary Philosophical Theories of Wellbeing

Abstract

Several philosophical theories of wellbeing claim Aristotelian ancestry and employ an Aristotelian construct of flourishing. Yet it is not clear how we should interpret Aristotle's notion of flourishing or eudaimonia. In this article, we offer an analysis of Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia and consider to what extent it can be categorized within the framework of contemporary philosophical theories of wellbeing. We stress the active character of Aristotelian flourishing and its focus on the development of living things over time, which contrasts with the static and passive character of contemporary philosophical accounts of wellbeing. We suggest that Aristotle is closest to a perfectionist theory of wellbeing, though even this requires some qualification. While rational activity in accord with virtue is central to Aristotle's account of living well, Aristotle also states that a range of practical human activities and propitious life circumstances are necessary (and, on some interpretations, constitutive) features of the flourishing life. As such, Aristotelian flourishing includes elements of moral and cognitive perfectionism as well as an objective list of external goods and presupposes one's embeddedness within communities. We close with a consideration of the implications of our argument for the philosophical and social scientific study of flourishing. Contemporary well-being philosophers should be mindful of ways in which Aristotelian eudaimonia extends beyond the dominant philosophical categories of wellbeing that have a static focus and concern themselves with subjective experience or the possession of objective goods. Social scientists should be transparent about the limits of invoking an Aristotelian pedigree to motivate their own theories of wellbeing and should understand the implications of more limited conceptions.

One Introduction

Human flourishing is a concept with a rich philosophical pedigree dating back to the classical era, and, in particular, Aristotle's ethical writings. Interest in flourishing has been rekindled with the mid-twentieth century revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics in moral philosophy as well as the focus on character and virtue in positive psychology and educational theory in recent decades. One might suggest that human flourishing is a more objective, holistic, stable, and universally applicable wellbeing construct than other constructs that focus on hedonic experience, preference satisfaction, or opportunity. What's more, flourishing might be thought to capture dimensions of human wellbeing that other constructs in the social sciences, such as hedonic happiness and evaluative happiness, fail to track.

Attempts to define human flourishing, however, have proved challenging. Part of the difficulty stems from Aristotle's own notion of flourishing as outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle describes the good life as rational activity in accord with virtue but also argues that contemplation is the highest human activity. In addition, he acknowledges the importance of 'external goods' - such as friendship, wealth, and political power - without which one could not realise the human good. It is not immediately obvious how we ought to view these external goods in light of Aristotle's definition of flourishing as rational activity in accord with virtue, nor is it obvious how contemplation relates to other dimensions of rational activity that we might take to be constitutive of flourishing.

It is also not immediately clear how Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of wellbeing. Several distinct contemporary theories of wellbeing claim Aristotelian ancestry, including perfectionist and so-called eudaimonist theories of wellbeing, Nussbaum and Sen's capabilities approach, some versions of objective list theory, along with some "life satisfaction" theorists such as Helliwell and hybrid theorists like Ryff and Singer.

Given the heterogeneity of interpretations of Aristotelian flourishing, this article seeks to clarify how an Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia ought to be understood in light of contemporary philosophical categories of wellbeing. In Part One, we offer a textual account of Aristotle's notion of human flourishing. In Part Two, we consider how it ought to be understood in light of contemporary philosophical taxonomies of wellbeing. We tentatively suggest that Aristotle advances a theory of wellbeing that contains elements of moral and intellectual perfectionism as well as a list of external goods that are prerequisites of the flourishing life. In part Three we discuss the implications of our argument for the philosophical and social scientific study of wellbeing.

This article is not intended as a defence of Aristotle's theory of wellbeing. It will, however, provide a critical analysis of what it means to invoke Aristotelian ancestry in one's approach to wellbeing and illustrate significant differences between the various philosophical and social scientific theories of wellbeing that invoke an Aristotelian pedigree.