Don’t buy the optics: To view Xi’s visit as a ‘reset’ would be a dangerous miscalculation

Don’t buy the optics: To view Xi’s visit as a ‘reset’ would be a dangerous miscalculation

China’s strategic culture differs from the West, and certainly from that of the United States. So, where a Donald Trump would telegraph intent and scream in capital letters on Truth Social, or a Scott Bessent would write an opinion piece in the Financial Times explaining American policy on Iran, Beijing would make subtle, almost imperceptible moves that are nevertheless pregnant with significance. I am thinking about Indian ambassador to China Vikram Doraswami’s recent column in Global Times, the Chinese state-owned newspaper. Forget about the content of the column, which in itself is noteworthy; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party allowed its media outlet to carry the point of view of an Indian envoy should tell you that China is giving signals. Those signals became almost too loud to ignore as Xi Jinping touched down in India on Saturday after a gap of seven years. A bevy of Chinese journalists, some of whom had arrived earlier, were talking about how “clean New Delhi is” and giving enthusiastic bites on India-China friendship. “We are friends, not rivals,” said a beaming Li Jingjing, stressing that the “world is looking at China-India cooperation.” Wenting Xie, another journalist, said, “the visit is a very important opportunity to further improve bilateral ties.” Mao Ning, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, upon landing in New Delhi, was posting touristy pictures on X, while reports emerged, coincidentally, I’m sure, that China Southern Airlines will resume Guangzhou-Delhi flights after six years. This is no longer signalling, but full-steam wooing of India by the Chinese Communist Party with a degree of coordination that is impossible in democracies. Which ideally should make one a little uncomfortable. Why is China suddenly projecting an image of friendship and warmth? Count me a cynic, but I’d rather wallow in cynicism than be vulnerable to one more backstabbing. Unfortunately, our public discourse never fails to miss the wood for the trees. As Xi’s aeroplane landed on the tarmac for the 18th Brics Summit, media buzz swirled around the possibility of a diplomatic “reset”. After years of frozen ties, military standoffs in the high Himalayas and simmering geopolitical hostility, the optics of the Chinese president and the Indian prime minister sharing a stage on Indian soil for the first time in seven years naturally invite optimism. Pundits and eager observers are quick to interpret every handshake, every bilateral sideline meeting, and every joint communiqué as the dawn of a renewed partnership. But viewing this summit through the lens of a fundamental reset is not just premature; it is a dangerous miscalculation. The cold, structural realities of the world’s most complex and consequential bilateral relationship have not gone away. What we are watching unfold before our eyes is not a return to the heady optimism of Mamallapuram. It is, rather, a calibrated, cautious re-engagement. For India, the immediate objective is to stabilise a volatile diplomatic relationship and bring a semblance of balance to an increasingly lopsided bilateral trade architecture. China has surpassed the United States to become India’s largest trading partner, with total bilateral trade hitting a historic record of $151.1 billion in the fiscal year ending March 2026. Simultaneously, India’s trade deficit with China has surged to an all-time high of $112.16 billion, climbing from $99.21 billion the previous year. New Delhi operates with absolutely no illusions about China’s long-term geopolitical posture. The aim right now is simply to manage the temperature, prevent accidental kinetic escalation along the disputed frontier and safeguard domestic economic interests from structural vulnerabilities. Beijing, on the other hand, views this diplomatic schmooze as a tactical re-engagement, and it is showing earnestness for a reason. For the CCP, this is a necessary, if temporary, manoeuvre to clear the path for unrestricted access to the Indian market. Facing an escalating trade war with the US, a sluggish domestic economy and the global reorganisation of supply chains, Beijing needs new avenues for its industrial overcapacity. As the largest economy in South Asia and the world’s fastest-growing consumer market, India represents a critical economic pressure valve. Beijing is also aware that the sustenance of BRICS as a functional, non-Western multilateral platform is crucial to its broader geopolitical agenda. Consider the carefully synchronised statements being made by the Chinese journalists in India. According to Wenting of Global Times, “China fully supports India’s work as Chair and is ready to work with all parties to promote this great BRICS cooperation. As you have mentioned, India is the Chair this year, and China fully supports India’s presidency.” China has invested heavily in positioning Brics as the vanguard of an alternative multipolar world order that challenges Western financial and institutional hegemony. Without India’s active and heavyweight participation, Brics risks becoming a hollow, China-centric echo chamber rather than the formidable geopolitical bloc Beijing envisions. Xi’s overtures of friendship and warmth in New Delhi are therefore designed specifically to achieve those objectives. On the economic front, “unrestricted access” remains a one-way street. While China pushes aggressively for frictionless entry into India’s markets, Beijing has simultaneously strengthened an impenetrable web of non-tariff barriers to shut out Indian pharmaceuticals, IT services, and agricultural exports. This deliberate asymmetry has reinforced a massive, structural trade deficit. Beijing weaponises its monopoly over critical minerals, restricts the export of heavy infrastructure equipment, and arbitrarily delays or denies visas for Indian engineers working on crucial joint ventures. This weaponisation of trade adds another layer of mistrust, proving that commercial interdependence with China remains a strategic vulnerability. These competing signals — of warm sound bites, smiles and bonhomie in New Delhi against the backdrop of militarised borders, military support to Pakistan, maritime encirclement, and economic coercion — put into sharp relief the structural realities of bilateral ties. To the extent possible, Brics provides a necessary opportunity to iron out the most severe creases in the bilateral relationship. It allows both sides to lower the temperature, resume direct lines of communication, and project an image of global statesmanship to the Global South. I would firmly categorise this bilateral meeting as temporary conflict management, not conflict resolution. The fundamentals of the India-China relationship remain overwhelmingly adversarial. Beyond the media buzz of a ‘historic turning point’, New Delhi knows that what lies ahead is not a renewed era of ‘brotherly cooperation’, but a tense, protracted phase of competitive coexistence, regardless of the smiling optics on display or a handshake on the sidelines of the summit.