PARTI
PARTI
One. Market definition
I. INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Monopolization, in the United States, and abuse of dominance, in the European Union, embody different philosophies about how best to police single firm conduct in competition law. Surprisingly, their disagreements end at market definition. Both doctrines define relevant markets by similar processes and use relevant markets for similar purposes. In some contexts, this type of agreement would be a welcome sight. Here, it reflects a pocket of confusion in each area of law.
This chapter describes the confusion of current market definition practices and takes some initial steps toward a more coherent approach. It begins, in Section Two, with a brief review of the common justifications for defining markets in single firm conduct cases, and a brief restatement of the common standards for defining markets. Section Three then turns a critical eye to the assumed connections between current market definition practices and the substantive purposes the resulting markets are meant to serve. Sections Four and Five sketch the outline of a more coherent approach to market definition in single firm conduct cases. The idea behind this approach is that markets should not be defined by rote application of omnibus standards, but should be defined by tests tailored to the specific purposes that relevant markets are meant to serve in a given application.