ARTICLE SIX THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
ARTICLE SIX THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION ONE. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM. One. A bicameral body.
Bicameralism is not a stranger to Philippine constitutionalism. The Jones Law provided for a bicameral legislature. The nineteen thirty-five Constitution initially departed from the bicameral model of the Jones Law and adopted a unicameral body, the National Assembly. By subsequent amendment, however, the National Assembly gave way to a bicameral Congress consisting of a Senate, elected by the nation at large, and a House of Representatives elected by district.
The original nineteen seventy-three Constitution reverted to unicameralism by providing for a National Assembly. But before the National Assembly could be activated, the Constitution was amended in nineteen seventy-six principally to provide for a unicameral interim Batasang Pambansa which convened in nineteen seventy-eight. A subsequent constitutional revision in nineteen eighty-one created the Batasang Pambansa, still a unicameral body. The Batasang Pambansa was overtaken by the February nineteen eighty-six Revolution and was abolished by President Aquino's Proclamation Number three of March twenty-five, nineteen eighty-six.
The supposed advantages of unicameralism were simplicity of organization resulting in economy and efficiency, facility in pinpointing responsibility for legislation, avoidance of duplication, and strengthening of the legislature in relation to the executive. It was also hoped that a unicameral assembly would be a more effective training ground for national leaders. These were the arguments which persuaded the nineteen seventy-one Constitutional Convention to adopt a unicameral legislative body. The debate over unicameralism and bicameralism resurfaced during the deliberations of the nineteen eighty-six Constitutional Commission. A free-wheeling debate on the subject opened the deliberations on the article on the legislative department and no other matter was taken up until the subject of bicameralism or unicameralism was settled. The arguments for bicameralism were the traditional ones which say that one an upper house is a body that looks at problems from the national perspective and thus serves as a check on the parochial tendency of a body elected by districts, two bicameralism allows for a more careful study of legislation, and three bicameralism is less vulnerable to attempts of the executive to control the legislature. Unicameralism was defended on the traditional grounds of simplicity and economy, and, drawing from the recent experience with "people power," on the ground of greater responsiveness to the needs of the masses because representatives, unlike senators without a fixed constituency, are forced to interact more intensely with their limited and clearly identifiable constituencies. But the end result was a vote of twenty-three to twenty-two in favor of a bicameral Congress.
national leaders. These were the arguments which persuaded the 197! Constitutional Convention to adopt a unicameral legislative body.' The debate over unicameralism and bicameralism resurfaced dur- ing the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. A free- wheeling debate on the subject opened the deliberations on the article on the legislative department and no other matter was taken up until the subject of bicameralism or unicameralism was settled. The argu- ments for bicameralism were the traditional ones which say that (1) an upper house is a body that looks at problems from the national perspec- tive and thus serves as a check on the parochial tendency of a body elected by districts, (2) bicameralism allows for a more careful study of legislation, and (3) bicameralism is less vulnerable to attempts of the executive to control the legislature. Unicameralism was defended on the traditional grounds of simplicity and economy, and, drawing from the recent experience with "people power," on the ground of greater responsiveness to the needs of the masses because representatives, un- like senators without a fixed constituency, are forced to interact more intensely with their limited and clearly identifiable constituencies. But the end result was a vote of 23-22 in favor of a bicameral Congress.2
Two. Nature of legislative power.
Two. Nature of legislative power.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter and repeal them. As vested by the Constitution in Congress, it is a derivative and delegated power. "The Constitution is the work or will of the people themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the legislature in their derivative and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the Creator, and the other of the creature. The constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit within which it must move." Unlike the Constitution of the United States which contains only a grant of enumerated legislative powers to the Federal Congress, the nineteen eighty-seven Constitution, like the nineteen seventy-three and nineteen thirty-five Constitutions, embodies a grant of plenary legislative power to the Philippine legislature. Thus, "any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is nec-
As corollary to this plenary grant of legislative power, it follows that the Congress alone can make laws and Congress may not delegate its law making power. This is the principle of non-delegability of legislative power. Its various ramifications will be examined at length later. Another corollary is that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. Judge Cooley explained the logic of this corollary thus: To say that the legislature may pass irrepealable laws, is to say that it may alter the very constitution from which it derives its authority; since, in so far as one legislature could bind a subsequent one by its enactments, it could in the same degree reduce the legislative power of its successors; and the process might be repeated, until, one by one, the subject of legislation would be excluded altogether from their control, and the constitutional provision that the legislative power shall be vested in two houses would be to a greater or less degree rendered ineffectual.