Rethinking clinical decision-making to improve clinical reasoning
Rethinking clinical decision-making to improve clinical reasoning
Improving clinical reasoning techniques is the right way to facilitate decision-making from prognostic, diagnostic, and therapeutic points of view. However, the process to do that is to fill knowledge gaps by studying and growing experience and knowing some cognitive aspects to raise the awareness of thinking mechanisms to avoid cognitive errors through correct educational training. This article examines clinical approaches and educational gaps in training medical students and young doctors. The authors explore the core elements of clinical reasoning, including metacognition, reasoning errors and cognitive biases, reasoning strategies, and ways to improve decision-making. The article addresses the dual-process theory of thought and the new Default Mode Network theory. The reader may consider the article a first-level guide to deepen how to think and not what to think, knowing that this synthesis results from years of study and reasoning in clinical practice and educational settings.
Introduction
Introduction
Clinical reasoning is based on complex and multifaceted cognitive processes, and the level of cognition is perhaps the most relevant factor that impacts the physician's clinical reasoning. These topics have inspired considerable interest in the last years. According to Croskerry and Croskerry and Norman, over forty affective and cognitive biases may impact clinical reasoning. In addition, it should not be forgotten that both the processes and the subject matter are complex.
In medicine, there are thousands of known diagnoses, each with different complexity. Moreover, in line with Hammond's view, a fundamental uncertainty will inevitably fail. Any mistake or failure in the diagnostic process leads to a delayed diagnosis, a misdiagnosis, or a missed diagnosis. The particular context in which a medical decision is made is highly relevant to the reasoning process and outcome.
More recently, there has been renewed interest in diagnostic reasoning, primarily diagnostic errors. Many researchers deepen inside the processes underpinning cognition, developing new universal reasoning and decision-making model: The Dual Process Theory.
This theory has a prompt implementation in medical decision-making and provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the gamut of theoretical approaches taken into consideration previously. This model has critical practical applications for medical decision-making and may be used as a model for teaching decision reasoning. Given this background, this manuscript must be considered a first-level guide to understanding how to think and not what to think, deepening clinical decision-making and providing tools for improving clinical reasoning.