Statutory Construction Chapter one. Preliminary Considerations
Statutory Construction Chapter one. Preliminary Considerations
Statutory Construction, Defined
In our jurisdiction, statutory construction has been defined as the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. Apparently, this definition was taken from Black's Construction and Interpretation of the Laws which likewise defined interpretation as the art or process of discovering and expounding on the intended signification of the language used, that is, the meaning which the authors of the law designed it to convey to others. Thus, Justice Martin defines statutory construction as the art of seeking the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state of facts.
American jurisprudence defines it as that branch of the law dealing with the interpretation of laws enacted by a legislature. A judicial function is required when a statute is invoked and different interpretations are in contention. Where legislature attempts to do several things, one of which is invalid, it may be discarded if the remainder of the act is workable and in no way depends upon the invalid portion,
but if that portion is an integral part of the act, and its excision changes the manifest intent of the act by broadening its scope to include subject matter or territory which was not included therein as enacted, such excision is "judicial legislation" and not "statutory construction." .
Construction and Interpretation, Distinguished
Construction and Interpretation, Distinguished
Strictly speaking, construction and interpretation are not the same although the two terms are often used interchangeably. Construction, however, to be technically correct, is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the text from elements known and given in the text, while interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of the language used. Thus, the court will resort to interpretation when it endeavors to ascertain the meaning of a word found in a statute, which when considered with the other words in the statute, may reveal a meaning different from that apparent when the word is considered abstractly or when given its usual meaning. But when the court goes beyond the language of the statute and seeks the assistance of extrinsic aids in order to determine whether a given case falls within the statute, it resorts to construction. The process to be used in any given case will depend upon the nature of the problem presented. And, as is apparent, both processes may be used in seeking the legislative intent in a given statute. If the legislative intent is not clear after the completion of interpretation, then the court will proceed to subject the statute to construction.
It will thus be seen that there is a substantial difference between interpretation and construction as methods for the exegesis of written laws. In strictness, interpretation is limited to exploring the written text, while construction goes beyond and may call in the aid of extrinsic considerations. "Interpretation," says Dr. Lieber, "differs from construction in that the former is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words, that is, the sense which their author intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text, from elements known from and given in the text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter, of the text. " Black, Construction and Interpretation of Law, page 3 .
The distinction, however, between the two processes is often vague, and so far as the courts are concerned apparently has little or no importance. Generally, the whole matter has been largely relegated to the realm of academic discussion, since for most practical purposes it is sufficient to designate the whole process of ascertaining the legislative intent as either interpretation or construction. This appears to be the customary judicial practice.

