The Empire Strikes Back: Comparing US and China's Structural Power in Outer Space

The Empire Strikes Back: Comparing US and China's Structural Power in Outer Space

This article assesses the structural power of the United States and China in the field of space governance. While much of the literature on space power focuses on their technologies and capabilities, we take a complementary approach and explore their capacity to shape the regulatory landscape. Possessing structural power has far-reaching implications for global power projection as well as for various industries, such as telecommunications, transportation, and remote sensing. To assess structural power, we gathered and analyzed three types of data: a dataset featuring seventeen hundred nine space organizations, a second dataset comprising seventeen hundred sixty-four international space arrangements connecting them, and insights from fifty-two interviews with key space actors. Our findings indicate that the United States holds significant structural power thanks to its thriving commercial space sector and extensive international network. This has enabled the global diffusion of its preferred norms while simultaneously constraining China's space cooperation network. Despite its remarkable technological capabilities, China has not been able to translate them into substantial global structural power. To encourage further exploration in this domain, we make available our original dataset of seventeen hundred sixty-four space arrangements, including nine hundred seventy in full-text format, inviting fellow researchers to investigate other facets of outer space governance.

Este artículo estudia el poder estructural de Estados Unidos y China en el campo de la gobernanza espacial. Si bien gran parte de la literatura sobre el poder espacial se centra en sus tecnologías y capacidades, en este artículo adoptamos un enfoque complementario y exploramos su capacidad para dar forma al panorama regulatorio. El hecho de tener poder estructural tiene implicaciones de gran alcance para la proyección del poder global, así como para diversos sectores, tales como las telecomunicaciones, el transporte y la teledetección. Con el fin de poder evaluar el poder estructural, recopilamos y analizamos tres tipos de datos: un conjunto de datos procedentes de mil setecientos nueve organizaciones espaciales, un segundo conjunto de datos que comprende mil setenta y seis acuerdos espaciales internacionales que conectan a estas organizaciones, e ideas extraídas de cincuenta y dos entrevistas con agentes espaciales clave. Nuestras conclusiones indican que Estados Unidos tiene un poder estructural significativo debido a su próspero sector espacial comercial y a su extensa red internacional. Esto ha permitido la difusión global de sus normas preferidas y, al mismo tiempo, ha restringido la red de cooperación espacial de China. China, por el contrario, a pesar de sus notables capacidades tecnológicas, no ha sido capaz de traducirlas en un poder estructural global sustancial. Con el objetivo de fomentar un mayor interés en este ámbito, ponemos a disposición nuestro conjunto de datos original procedente de mil setenta y seis acuerdos espaciales, incluyendo novecientos setenta en formato de texto completo, e invitamos a otros investigadores a investigar otras facetas de la gobernanza del espacio exterior.

Cet article évalue le pouvoir structurel des États-Unis et de la Chine dans le domaine de la gouvernance spatiale. Tandis que la majorité de la littérature sur l'espace se concentre sur leurs technologies et capacités, nous adoptons une approche complémentaire pour nous intéresser à leur capacité à façonner le paysage réglementaire. La détention du pouvoir structurel s'accompagne d'importantes implications en matière de projection mondiale du pouvoir, mais aussi pour divers secteurs, comme les télécommunications, les transports et la télédétection. Pour évaluer le pouvoir structurel, nous rassemblons et analysons trois types de données : un ensemble de données où figurent mil sept cent neuf organisations spatiales, un deuxième comprenant mil sept cent soixante-quatre accords internationaux sur l'espace, et des informations issues de cinquante-deux entretiens avec des acteurs clés du domaine spatial. Nos résultats indiquent que les États-Unis détiennent un important pouvoir structurel grâce à un secteur spatial commercial florissant et un large réseau international. Ils ont ainsi pu diffuser leurs normes tout en limitant le réseau de coopération spatiale de la Chine. Malgré des capacités technologiques remarquables, la Chine n'a pas pu les traduire en un pouvoir structurel considérable à l'échelle mondiale. Pour faciliter les recherches ultérieures dans ce domaine, nous mettons à disposition notre ensemble de données inédit de mil sept cent soixante-quatre arrangements spatiaux, dont neuf cent soixante-dix textes complets, pour inciter la recherche portant sur d'autres facettes de la gouvernance de l'espace extra-atmosphérique.

Introduction

China's space capabilities have made significant strides in recent years. In two thousand three, it launched its first crewed spacecraft, becoming the third country to independently send humans to space. In two thousand seven, China successfully demonstrated its ability to disrupt space-based infrastructure by destroying one of its own weather satellites using a kinetic kill vehicle. The country's achievements continued with the very first successful landing on the far side of the Moon in two thousand nineteen and the completion of its BeiDou satellite navigation system in two thousand twenty, providing global coverage with an accuracy level comparable to the American Global Positioning System. In addition, China has launched its own modular space station and is currently developing plans for a permanent lunar base. These developments suggest that China is narrowing the gap with the United States in terms of outer space capabilities.

Numerous publications discuss the rivalry between the United States and China in outer space. Most of them argue that China is emerging as a space superpower, rapidly closing the gap with the United States. Cheng suggests that the United States "faces its greatest space competitor since the dawn of the Space Age" in the form of China, and Pollpeter asserts that China's space program "poses military, economic, and political challenges to the United States." Sheehan goes as far as suggesting that China will soon be in a position to negate US space hegemony. There is also a growing number of governmental reports with titles like "Are We Losing the Space Race to China?" or "China's Ambition in Space: Contesting the Final Frontier," highlighting the level of concern within the US government apparatus. The two thousand twenty-three Annual Threat Assessment report of the US intelligence community warns that "China's space activities are designed to advance its global standing and strengthen its attempts to erode U.S. influence across military, technological, economic, and diplomatic spheres." Equally revealing of current anxieties is the proliferation of science fiction novels, movies, and television series depicting confrontations between China and the United States over the control of the Moon or the solar system.

This article offers a different and complementary perspective by focusing on the structural power of the United States and China, which refers to their ability to shape the overall framework within which interactions among various actors occur. More specifically, this article assesses the respective capacities of the United States and China to influence global space governance, rather than comparing their material or technological capabilities. While structural power and capabilities are interrelated, they remain distinct concepts and one does not automatically translate into the other. Although capabilities may be more relevant for predicting the outcome of a particular conflict, having the capacity to define the rules of the game offers numerous long-term advantages, including for commercial profitability, intelligence gathering, and international prestige. Structural power also facilitates the accumulation of material and technological capabilities over the long term. In recent times, the stakes have heightened, with the burgeoning space industry, the impending race for asteroid mining, and the development of space-based broadband internet services. In this context, the space actor with the most structural power can expect a wide array of benefits stemming from its privileged position.

To assess US and Chinese structural power, we examine three original data sources: a comprehensive dataset of one thousand seven hundred nine space organizations, another dataset of one thousand seven hundred sixty-four international institutional arrangements connecting these organizations (which we make publicly available on the journal's website and at our website), and fifty-two interviews with key actors in this field. Employing a mix of network analysis, descriptive statistics, and qualitative analysis, we find that the United States remains the main structural power in outer space governance and that China has not been able to translate its technological capabilities into substantial global structural power. This finding provides an important caveat to the common view that China is closing a historic gap.

This article is divided into four sections. The first section outlines our understanding of structural space power, which encompasses three dimensions: (i) the transnational reach of both public and private actors, (ii) network centrality that allows for leveraging a strategic position to influence the structure of the network itself, and (iii) rule-making capacity, which is the power to disseminate one's preferred rules. The subsequent sections each focus on one dimension of structural space power. First, we map the landscape of space actors and discuss the emergence of transnational private actors and its implications for the United States-China rivalry. Then, we look at global governance networks and identify patterns of cooperation and isolation that strengthen US centrality. In the third empirical section, we analyze the content of institutional arrangements and highlight the extent of US influence on global regulations. In the conclusion, we underscore the importance of structural power in fields as fragmented as the outer space governance system.