Who Caused the Ukraine War?

Who Caused the Ukraine War?

The question of who is responsible for causing the Ukraine war has been a deeply contentious issue since Russia invaded Ukraine on twenty-four February twenty twenty-two.

The answer to this question matters enormously because the war has been a disaster for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is that Ukraine has effectively been wrecked. It has lost a substantial amount of its territory and is likely to lose more, its economy is in tatters, huge numbers of Ukrainians are internally displaced or have fled the country, and it has suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties. Of course, Russia has paid a significant blood price as well. On the strategic level, relations between Russia and Europe, not to mention Russia and Ukraine, have been poisoned for the foreseeable future, which means that the threat of a major war in Europe will be with us well after the Ukraine war turns into a frozen conflict. Who bears responsibility for this disaster is a question that will not go away anytime soon and if anything is likely to become more prominent as the extent of the disaster becomes more apparent to more people.

The conventional wisdom in the West is that Vladimir Putin is responsible for causing the Ukraine war. The invasion aimed at conquering all of Ukraine and making it part of a greater Russia, so the argument goes. Once that goal was achieved, the Russians would move to create an empire in eastern Europe, much like the Soviet Union did after World War Two. Thus, Putin is ultimately a threat to the West and must be dealt with forcefully. In short, Putin is an imperialist with a master plan who fits neatly into a rich Russian tradition.

The alternative argument, which I identify with, and which is clearly the minority view in the West, is that the United States and its allies provoked the war. This is not to deny, of course, that Russia invaded Ukraine and started the war. But the principal cause of the conflict is the NATO decision to bring Ukraine into the alliance, which virtually all Russian leaders see as an existential threat that must be eliminated. NATO expansion, however, is part of a broader strategy that is designed to make Ukraine a

Western bulwark on Russia's border. Bringing Kyiv into the European Union and promoting a color revolution in Ukraine - turning it into pro-Western liberal democracy - are the other two prongs of the prongs, but they fear NATO expansion the

The debate about who caused the Ukraine war has been a prominent issue in the West, with prominent Western leaders - former President Nigel Farage - made the argument that I behind the conflict. Unsurprisingly, their counterargument came under attack from defenders of the conventional wisdom, including the outgoing Secretary General of NATO, Jer year that "President Putin started this war be and deny Ukraine the right to choose its own challenged this remarkable admission by NA

My aim here is to provide a primer, which lays that Putin invaded Ukraine not because he was an imperialist bent on making Ukraine part of a greater Russia, but mainly because of NATO expansion and the West's efforts to make Ukraine a Western stronghold on Russia's border.

Let me start with the seven main reasons to reject the conventional wisdom.

First, there is simply no evidence from before twenty-four February twenty twenty-two that Putin wanted to conquer Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia. Proponents of the conventional wisdom cannot point to anything Putin wrote or said that indicates he was bent on conquering Ukraine.

When challenged on this point, purveyors of the conventional wisdom provide evidence that has little if any bearing on Putin's motives for invading Ukraine. For example, some emphasize that he said Ukraine is an "artificial state" or not a "real state." Such opaque comments, however, say nothing about his reason for going to war. The same is true of Putin's statement that he views Russians and Ukrainians as "one people" with a common history. Others point out that he called the collapse of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century." But Putin also said, "Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain." Still, others point to a speech in which he declared that "Modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia." But that hardly constitutes evidence that he was interested in conquering Ukraine. Moreover, he said in that same speech: "Of course, we cannot change past events, but we must at least admit them openly and honestly."

To make the case that Putin was bent on conquering all of Ukraine and incorporating it into Russia, it is necessary to provide evidence that one, he thought it was a desirable goal, two, he thought it was a feasible goal, and three, he intended to pursue that goal. There is no evidence in the public record that Putin was contemplating, much less intending to put an end to Ukraine as an independent state and make it part of greater Russia when he sent his troops into Ukraine on twenty-four February twenty twenty-two.

In fact, there is significant evidence that Putin recognized Ukraine as an independent country. In his well-known twelve July twenty twenty-one article dealing with Russian-Ukrainian relations, which proponents of the conventional wisdom often point to as evidence of his imperial ambitions, he tells the Ukrainian people, "You want to establish a state of your own: you are welcome!" Regarding how Russia should treat Ukraine, he writes, "There is only one answer: with respect." He concludes that lengthy article with the following words: "And what Ukraine will be-it is up to its citizens to decide." These statements are directly at odds with the claim that Putin wanted to incorporate Ukraine within a greater Russia.

In that same twelve July twenty twenty-one article and again in an important speech he gave on twenty-one February twenty twenty-two, Putin emphasized that Russia accepts "the new geopolitical reality that took shape after the dissolution of the USSR." He reiterated that same point for a third time on twenty-four February twenty twenty-two, when he announced that Russia would invade Ukraine. In particular, he declared that "It is not our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory" and made it clear that he respected Ukrainian sovereignty, although only up to a point: "Russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist while facing a permanent threat from the territory of today's Ukraine." In essence, Putin was not interested in making Ukraine a part of Russia; he was interested in making sure it did not become a "springboard“ for Western aggression against Russia.

Second, there is no evidence that Putin was preparing a puppet government for Ukraine, cultivating pro-Russian leaders in Kyiv, or pursuing any political measures that would make it possible to occupy the entire country and eventually integrate it into Russia.

Those facts fly in the face of the claim that Putin was interested in erasing Ukraine from the map.