BENITA S. BALINON, petitioner, vs. CELESTINO M. DE LEON ET AL., respondents.
BENITA S. BALINON, petitioner, vs. CELESTINO M. DE LEON ET AL., respondents.
DECISION
The Solicitor General has filed a complaint against the respondent Celestino M. de Leon and Justo T. Velayo, duly qualified members of the bar in active practice, alleging that, since December, nineteen forty-eight, respondent De Leon, still legally married to Vertudes Marquez, lived as husband and wife with Regina S. Balinon; that said respondent prepared and subscribed on February four, nineteen forty-eight, before respondent Velayo, a notary public, an affidavit which reads as follows:
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
"I, Celestino de Leon, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen, after being duly sworn to according to law depose and say:
"That there exists a contract of separation executed and perfected between my wife, Vertudes Marquez and myself;
"That said contract states among other things that each of us is at liberty and free to take for himself and herself a lifetime partner with the full consent and authorization of each other;
"That by the same contract our conjugal partnership was dissolved and our existing property, rights and interests were divided and apportioned;
"That in the said contract my wife shall have the full control, care and custody of the children, and as such all of our conjugal property rights and interests were apportioned to her with the exception of my private personal belongings and things pertaining to my law profession;
"That, besides the said dissolution and apportionment, said contract further states about my wife's and also my children's share to my current income by way of alimony and support;
"Now, therefore, by virtue of the said contract of separation, I now by these presents take my new found life-partner Regina S. Balinon, as my true and lawful wife;
"That, in order to protect her rights and interests with regards to her personality and future property rights, I, hereby voluntarily and of my own free will solemnly swear under oath;
"That I will uphold and defend her honor and dignity and prestige as a woman of the weaker sex as well as any and all members of her family arising by reasons of said relationship;
"That I will remain loyal and faithful to her as a lawful and devoted loving husband for the rest of my life at all costs;
"That I will maintain and preserve the new existing companionship, the love, respect and goodwill prevailing among the members of her family of which I am now a member as well as equally mine;
The complaint also alleges that, notwithstanding the unlawful and immoral purposes of the foregoing affidavit, respondent Velayo knowingly signed the same in violation of his oath of office as attorney and notary public.
Respondent De Leon admits his continuous cohabitation with Regina S. Balinon during his subsisting marriage with Vertudes Marquez and the fact that he prepared and subscribed the affidavit above quoted, but contends that he has not yet been finally convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; that while the affidavit may be illicit, it is not an agreement but a mere innocent unilateral declaration of facts; and that while the execution of said affidavit may be illegal and void ab initio, no specific law has been violated so as to give rise to an action. Respondent Velayo alleges, on the other hand, that his participation was limited to the task of notarizing the affidavit, as a matter of courtesy to a brother lawyer and without knowing its contents, and this allegation is corroborated by respondent De Leon who further stated that no consideration whatsoever passed to the former.
This court had heretofore imposed the penalty of suspension upon an attorney who prepared a document stipulating, among others, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife, authorized each other to marry again and that each renounced whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. In effect the affidavit prepared and signed by respondent De Leon has similar implication, in that although it does not bluntly authorize said respondent to marry another during his subsisting wedlock with Vertudes Marquez, he made it appear that he could take in another woman as a lifetime partner to whom he would remain loyal and faithful as a lawful and devoted loving husband and whom he could take and respect as his true and lawful wife; thereby virtually permitting himself to commit the crime of concubinage. It is true, as respondent De Leon argues, that the consent or pardon of either spouse constitutes a bar to a criminal prosecution for adultery and concubinage, but, as the Solicitor General observes, said crimes are not thereby legalized, the result being merely that prosecution in such cases would not lie. The contention that the affidavit is only a unilateral declaration of facts is of no moment, since it undoubtedly enabled respondent De Leon to attain his purpose of winning over Regina S. Balinon with some degree of permanence.
It is likewise insisted that the acts imputed to respondent De Leon had no relation with his professional duties and therefore cannot serve as a basis for suspension or disbarment under section twenty-five of Rule one hundred twenty-seven. It should be remembered, however, that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer on grounds other than those enumerated by said provision. Moreover, we can even state that respondent De Leon was able to prepare the affidavit in question because he is a lawyer, and has rendered professional service to himself as a client. He surely employed his knowledge of the law and skill as an attorney to his advantage.
With reference to respondent Velayo, there is no question that he did nothing except to affix his signature to the affidavit in question as a notary public. While, as contended by his counsel, the duty of a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him at least to guard against having anything to do with an illegal or immoral arrangement. In the present case respondent Velayo was somewhat negligent in just affixing his signature to the affidavit, although his fault is mitigated by the fact that he had relied on the good faith of his co-respondent.
Wherefore, we hereby decree the suspension from the practice of law of respondent Celestino M. de Leon for three years from the date of the promulgation of this decision. Respondent Justo T. Velayo is hereby merely reprimanded. So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.