The Political Economy of Western Aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Since 1993
The Political Economy of Western Aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Since 1993
In the summer of 2012, a Palestinian theatre company toured the West Bank with its production, Beit Yasmine (House of Yasmine). Shown to packed theatre houses, the play narrates the story of the shooting and subsequent treatment of human rights activist, Yasmine. While she lies critically wounded, her family is required to write and submit a proposal for medicine which will only be accepted if they also supply a written assurance (the Anti-terrorism Certification ) that none of it will go to 'terrorists'. When the medicine arrives, the family discuss whether it will be addictive or not; a debate ensues where they are assured by the 'medical expert' that in small doses it will be beneficial. However, simultaneously, other 'experts' arrive with more types of medicine, and it soon becomes clear it is best that Yasmine remains ill in order to continue receiving such care, and for those around her to profit from it. The rebellious son of Yasmine, who initially opposes the medicine, is plied with offers of paid study abroad or a comfortable salary in a good job for his silence and acquiescence - thus posing him with a severe moral dilemma.
Clearly Beit Yasmine was articulating some of the frustrations being expressed by Palestinians towards western aid and donors in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). In particular, that aid has become a 'game' and a corrupting force – for both beneficiaries and benefactors – and that it is shrouded in a fundamental dishonesty. From a population that was, for a few years (until recently), one of the largest per capita beneficiaries of foreign aid in the world, this is a damning critique, and one that requires serious exploration.
The context for aid and humanitarian assistance provided to the Palestinian people has gone through a number of phases. In the initial period after the creation of the state of Israel and the Nakba in nineteen forty-eight,humanitarian assistance, distributed through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), was provided for Palestinian refugees (see Chapter five in this book). After Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in nineteen sixty-seven,a few Arab donors provided aid; and after the nineteen seventy-eight Camp David Accord between Israel and Egypt, USAID and UNDP began to operate in the oPtpoint four However, it was after one hundred ninety-three and the signing of the 'Declaration of Principles' (better known as the Oslo Accord) between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)and the state of Israel,that the volume of aid and number of western donors operating in the oPt ballooned; and thereafter they became deeply involved in its political economy. While the activities of UNRWA continued to be funded. and thus Palestinians outside of the oPt were not completely ignored, most donor attention and activity was thereafter focused on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.
This chapter is therefore focused on critically unpacking the political economy of western donor aid since 1993; the context for which has been the 'Oslo peace paradigm' which includes both the structural framework created by the Oslo Accord and the ideational framework surrounding and guiding this aid. It does not analyse the agendas and impacts of non-western aid and donors, important though they are (particularly those from the Arab world ), because although they operate within a similar structural reality, their ideational framework is different (in addition, reliable data on their activities is sporadic and difficult to access). The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one describes the Oslo framework and the structural context for aid, while section two unpacks the ideational framework surrounding it. Section three critically reflects on western aid in the context of occupation and colonization, and argues that the concept of de-development no longer, on its own, adequately explains the political economy of the oPt. Section four concludes the chapter by arguing that western aid has played a major role in the political economy of the oPt in three ways. First, through the impact of donor-funded spending and involvement in the governance structures of the Palestinian Authority. Second, by helping to fragment the oPt geographically by working through the Oslo framework long past the five-year interim period. And, third, through the 'partners for peace' discursive framework which has been used to manipulate Palestinian elites. Because of this, the chapter argues, the type of peace being supported by western donors needs to be unpacked and subjected to critical scrutiny.
The 'Oslo framework' and the structural context for aid
The 'Oslo framework' and the structural context for aid
The expansion of western aid and donor involvement took place through and within the Oslo framework created by the Oslo Accord and subsequent agreements which committed both parties to track-one bilateral negotiations towards a resolution of the conflict. The Oslo framework thus established an interim administration, the Palestinian Authority (PA), as a form of self-rule, and handed over small pockets of territory to its management. The PA was given limited autonomy over the civil affairs of the majority of the Palestinian people living in the West Bank and Gaza (but not over the land) as Israel's military forces formally withdrew from some high-density population areas while continuing to control access to and from them (and making frequent military incursions and arrest raids into them). Geographically, the oPt was divided into administrative parcels: in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem which had been annexed after the 1967 occupation) into Area A (under PA civilian and security control), Area B (under PA civilian control and Israeli security control) and Area C (under full Israeli control); in Hebron into H1 (akin to Area A) and H2 (akin to Area C); and in Gaza into Yellow and White Areas. This was structured as follows: 18 per cent of the West Bank was designated Area A holding 55 per cent of the Palestinian population, Area B was 20 per cent of territory with 41 per cent of the population, and Area C was 62 per cent of territory with 5.8 per cent of the population. This framework has remained in place despite the fact that it was only supposed to be for an interim period of five years, while final status negotiations on refugees, borders, Jerusalem, water rights and Israeli settlements took place. However, withdrawals and transfers of power were frozen in 2000, and there has been no significant redeployment of Israeli forces, apart from Gaza in 2005 (thereafter put under siege). Areas A and B (or a combination of both) are surrounded by Area C, meaning there is no geographical contiguity for areas under PA administration, which also makes movement and access difficult for Palestinians.
The Oslo framework continued Israel's already-existing control over external borders and key factors of production (including land, water and the movement of labour) and did not deter Israel's practices of land grabbing and settlement expansion. Israel also retained control over key Palestinian state-building resources including trade and fiscal revenue, the proceeds of which were to be given by Israel to the P A as 'revenue transfers' as enshrined in the Paris Economic Protocol, P E P, –the framework for economic relations between the P A and Israel. The P E P established a quasi-customs union which has been detrimental to the economy of the o P t as it left the P A with no control over macroeconomic or exchange rate policy, it led to huge amounts of fiscal leakage (documented as being over U S dollars 200 million by 2013) and it imposed a tariff structure appropriate to an advanced industrialized global economy not to an underdeveloped economy emerging out of military occupation.
By the time of the signing of the Oslo Accord, 26 years of Israeli military occupation had taken its toll on the political economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinians had suffered from land expropriations, restrictions on the use of natural resources. low levels of public investment, an undeveloped economic infrastructure and industrial base, poor and fragmented social services, feeble local government, a weak financial sector and a loose legal and regulatory system. This threw up huge challenges for developing the economy and creating governmental structures in the o P t in preparation for final status negotiations. Promoting development that could underpin statehood was further undermined by Israel's strategy of 'asymmetric containment' and the Oslo framework—both of which ensured the continuation of Israel's economic dominance and control over key Palestinian resources. (See Chapter 1 in this book.)
Into this context and framework, around 40 donor countries and 20 U N and other multilateral agencies have given aid for governance, development and humanitarian activities. Western donors have committed significant resources as shown by the level of overseas development assistance, O D A, which rose from U S dollars 39.24 million in 1993 to U S dollars 1.741 billion in 2009; it thereafter dipped so that by 2012 it was U S dollars 1.099 billion. (See Figure 2.1.) When O D A figures are given for all donors and multilateral agencies, this increases from U S dollars 178.74 million in 1993 to U S dollars 2.011 billion in 2012. Budget support was provided to the P A and hundreds of international and local N G Os were established and competed to implement donor programmes. However, it should be noted that the mechanisms for reporting and documenting aid have improved significantly since the mid-1990s and so earlier figures do not adequately capture the level of O D A provided. In 2013, the I M F estimated that since its creation. the P A has received more than U S dollars 15 billion in aid from bilateral and multilateral donors (which constitutes 15 per cent of G D P per year), with annual per capita aid averaging U S dollars 340.
Regular pledging conferences and other donor meetings have played a key role in mobilizing assistance although it has often been difficult to distinguish between 'new' and 'old' pledges, and pledges have not always translated into disbursements. In fact, in 2012, donor countries pledged U S dollars 1.3 billion but had only transferred U S dollars 800 million in funds, adding a U S dollars 500 million deficit to the P A's 2013 budget, which by June 2013 had reached U S dollars 4.2 billion. The gap between budget assistance requested by the P A and that received from donors was U S dollars 694 million in 2012 and U S dollars 438 million in 2011. (See Figure 2.2.) This has contributed to the P A's fiscal crisis, which will be explored later in this chapter.
To coordinate aid, an elaborate layer of oversight committees was formed by the Western donors, with bodies at the national level and at the local level. (See Figure 2.3.) This type of oversight arrangement reflects common donor practice in other war-torn societies – where they have either directly controlled the state-building process through the creation of a transitional administration (often, but not always, administered by the U N) such as in Kosovo or East Timor, or have dominated the state-building process through governance assistance and involvement in key ministries such as in Sierra Leone or Liberia. However, the P A is unlike any other governance structure witnessed in either a colonial or conflict context (see Chapter 9 in this book). The only body which holds sovereignty over the land, resources and people of the o P t is the occupying power, Israel, despite the fact that the Oslo framework and the creation of the P A blurred this. Indeed, the necessity for large and continuing amounts of aid is caused by the lack of control that Palestinians have over their resources (both natural and human).
Due to the huge numbers of donors and multilateral agencies involved in the o P t, there was an 'aid politburo' of the dominant players: the U S, the E U, the World Bank and the U N. The World Bank is the leading multilateral actor in donor coordination: it holds key positions in nearly every committee and is the administrator of the multi-donor trust funds. The U N has multiple agencies operational in the o P t overseen by the U N Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East Peace Process (U N S C O). Through the European Commission and individual Member States, the E U has been the largest donor. However, the most important third-party actor is the U S, which has been the dominant external and military power in the region since the 1970s and which has overseen the diplomatic process. U S support for Israel throughout this period has been unconditional, cemented by both generous aid (around U S$3 billion annually, almost all of it military aid, although in the past it included significant economic assistance) and in political/diplomatic terms (through strong support within the U S Congress and within the U N).
While the U S's role is unquestionably problematic, all other donors have tended not to overtly challenge U S positions for self-interested foreign policy reasons, although tensions and friction have arisen on occasion. Donor relationships and roles in the o P t therefore reflect global structures of power as they operate in the Middle East. Le More characterizes donor relationships and roles in the o P t thus: 'the U S decides, the World Bank leads, the E U pays, the U N feeds.' Nothing much has altered to disrupt this general rule, not even the creation of the Quartet (which includes the E U, the U S, the U N and Russia) in 2002. Indeed, a senior French official stated: 'As [ex-Secretary of State] Colin Powell admitted to me, the reason why the Quartet was formed was to make sure that nobody else could do anything.' This became clear to some involved, including Alvaro De Soto, the U N Secretary General's Special Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process 2005 to 207, who stated, in a leaked confidential 'End of Mission Report': 'Whatever the Quartet was at the inception, let us be frank with ourselves: today, as a practical matter, the Quartet is pretty much a group of friends of the U S – and the U S doesn't feel the need to consult closely with the Quartet except when it suits it.' It is perhaps also worth making the (too obvious) point that none of these organizations are elected by people in the o P t, and there is thus no democratic oversight over what they do.

